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Abstract 
 
This paper analyses the relationship between market power in the loan and deposit 
markets and efficiency in the EU15 countries over 1993-2002. Results show the 
existence of a positive relationship between market power and cost X-efficiency, 
allowing rejection of the so-called quiet life hypothesis (Berger and Hannan, 1998). The 
social welfare loss attributable to market power in 2002 represented 0.54% of the GDP 
of the EU15. Results show that the welfare gains associated with a reduction of market 
power are greater than the loss of bank cost efficiency, showing the importance of 
economic policy measures aimed at removing the barriers to outside competition. 
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1. Introduction 
Economic theory emphasizes the gains that perfectly competitive markets 
represent over those in which market power exists, insofar as the existence of market 
power implies a net loss of social welfare. In the case of the banking sector, the analysis 
of market power is especially important because it translates into a higher cost of 
financial intermediation, a lower volume of savings and investment, and therefore 
lowers economic growth. However, often some level of market power is accepted 
because it is assumed that higher profits would reduce the risk and enhance the stability 
of the banking system.  
The economic authorities have always been aware of the importance of reducing 
the levels of market power in banking markets so that they can be as competitive as 
possible. Thus, since the mid-1980s, both national and European authorities have 
adopted measures tending to the liberalization of banking markets with initiatives like 
the freedom to branch expansion throughout the country, the liberalization of interest 
rates, the opening of the sector to foreign competition, the elimination of compulsory 
investment coefficients, etc. More recently, the Second Banking Directive (implemented 
between 1991 and 1994 by the different European countries), the creation of the 
European Monetary Union in 1999, and the approval and implementation of the 
Financial Services Action Plan by the European Commission between 1999 and 2004 
gave new impulse to the creation of a single European financial services market. 
In the academic sphere there has also been great interest in the measurement of 
the degree of competition in banking markets. Thus, in recent years there have appeared 
a substantial number of studies that use different indicators of competition (Lerner 
index, Panzar and Rosse´s test, Bresnanhan´s mark-up test, conjectural variation 
parameter) with empirical applications whose purpose is to analyze competitive rivalry 
in banking markets1.  
In the specific case of European banking sectors, the results of the studies 
carried out show the existence of market power, not being  possible to reject the 
situation of monopolistic competition (Bikker and Haaf, 2002; De Bandt and Davis, 
2000; Fernández de Guevara et al., 2006). In general, the studies referring to the 
European banking system have focused on measuring the degree of competition without 
analyzing the factors that may explain the existence of market power. Only Fernández 
de Guevara et al. (2005) try to identify the factors that explain this non-competitive 
behavior, using as an empirical reference the principal European banking sectors. Also, 
                                                 
1 See a recent survey of this issue in Berger et al. (2003). 
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few studies have quantified the capacity of banking firms to set prices above the 
marginal costs in different banking products. As Fernández de Guevara et al. (2005) 
show using aggregate information on interest rates, the degree of competition varies 
depending on the banking product considered (consumer loans, mortgage loans, 
deposits, etc). 
An important question that has not received attention in the European case is the 
analysis of the consequences of market power for the efficient management of banks. In 
markets where the pressure of competition is low there may be an incentive for 
managers not to concern themselves with reducing inefficiency. The rationality of this 
behavior can be justified basically for the following reasons. First, the managers may 
have fewer incentives to manage the firm efficiently because the capacity to establish a 
price above marginal cost generates sufficient profits to justify their management. 
Second, thanks to market power, the managers may pursue objectives other than the 
maximization of profit, such as the growth of the firm, of the staff, or the reduction of 
labor conflict by means of higher wages, at the expense of efficiency. Furthermore, the 
managers may devote resources to maintaining and increasing the levels of market 
power.  
The positive relationship between market power and inefficiency is known as the 
“quiet life” effect. In the case of the banking sector, the only study that tests this 
hypothesis is Berger and Hannan (1998) for U.S. banks, which considers the 
relationship between cost efficiency levels and the market power of banking 
institutions. Nevertheless, this study presents the limitation of using market 
concentration (the Herfindahl index) as a proxy for market power. Thus, recent studies 
show the limitations of using market concentration measures as indicators of banking 
competition (Berger et al., 2003; Maudos and Fernández de Guevara, 2004; Fernández 
de Guevera et al., 2005a; Claessen and Laeven, 2004; among others). 
In this context, the study has three fundamental aims: a) to quantify the level of 
market power in European banking sectors distinguishing different types of products 
(loans and deposits); b) to analyze the relationship between X-inefficiency in costs and 
the market power of the European banks; and c) to estimate the loss of welfare 
associated with market power. In the latter case, we analyze and quantify the two ways 
in which market power generates costs: the loss of net social welfare (Harberger´s 
triangle) associated with the setting of prices above marginal costs, and the loss of 
efficiency in the management of the banks associated with the “quiet life” hypothesis.  
Although we take as our starting point the study by Berger and Hannan (1998), 
the contributions of the study are as follows. Firstly, and in order to avoid the 
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limitations presented by the use of measures of concentration as indicators of 
competition, we use Lerner indices of market power. The advantage of the Lerner index 
over other indicators of competition (such as Panzar and Ross´s test) is that it allows 
market power to be proxied at bank level and its evolution over time analyzed. 
Secondly, considering that banks can exercise different market power on either side of 
the balance sheet, we estimate indicators of market power separately for the markets of 
loans and deposits, this being the only study (as far as we know) that deals with this 
question in the case of European banks. Furthermore, unlike what is usual in the 
literature which deals with the measurement of market power, we estimate the marginal 
costs necessary for the calculation of the Lerner indices on the basis of a frontier costs 
function. And thirdly, we estimate the welfare losses associated with market power, 
both those related to the social loss from higher prices (welfare triangle), and the 
possible losses attributable to the cost inefficiency generated by the relaxation in bank 
management (quiet life effect). To estimate the social cost associated with market 
power, instead of making assumptions regarding the demand elasticities and market 
power as in Berger and Hannan (1998), we use a direct measure of the welfare loss 
following the methodology used in Oroz and Salas (2003), Fernández de Guevara et al. 
(2005) and Fernández de Guevara and Maudos (2004), where Harberger´s welfare 
triangle is shown to be proportional to the Lerner index. 
Results referring to the banking sectors of the EU15 show that although market 
power has decreased in the deposit market, the relative margins (Lerner index) have 
increased in the loan market. In the deposit market, margins are negative in the last 
years of the period analyzed, which suggests that banks follow a loss leader pricing 
strategy. We find a positive relationship between market power and cost X-efficiency, 
permitting us to reject the quiet life hypothesis. The social welfare loss attributable to 
market power in 2002 represented 0.54% of the EU15 GDP, with substantial variability 
across countries. Our results suggest that the welfare gains associated with a fall in 
market power may be far larger than the loss of bank cost efficiency driven by this 
lower level of market power. This fact shows the importance of the economic policy 
measures aimed at removing the barriers or obstacles that protect national markets from 
outside competition. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on 
the relationship between market power and efficiency. Section 3 describes the 
approximation used in the estimation of market power, efficiency and the quantification 
of welfare loss from mis-pricing. Section 4 shows the results of the estimation of market 
power and the welfare triangle referring to the banking sectors of the EU15. Section 5 
 5
focuses on the relationship between efficiency and market power. Finally, section 6 
contains the conclusions. 
 
2. Market power and efficiency: background 
 This section reviews the theoretical and empirical background of the relationship 
between market power and efficiency. The literature on this issue is related to the 
hypotheses that explain the relationship between market structure and performance. In 
fact, the quiet life hypothesis is considered a special case of one of these hypotheses (the 
market power hypothesis). 
 In this context, there are three main hypotheses explaining the relationship 
between market structure and performance. The first one is the collusion hypothesis, 
also called the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) hypothesis (Bain, 1956). This 
hypothesis postulates that greater profits are the results of collusion between the firms 
of the industry. Thus, the SCP paradigm assumes that higher concentration enables 
banks to collude, which translates into extra profits. 
 The second one is the efficient structure hypothesis (Demsetz, 1973) which 
proposes an alternative explanation for the positive correlation between concentration 
and profitability, affirming that the most efficient banks obtain both greater profitability 
and market shares and, as a consequence, the market becomes more concentrated. In 
this case, the positive relationship observed between concentration and profitability is 
spurious and simply proxies for the relationship between superior efficiency, market 
share and concentration. More recently, Berger (1995) divided this hypothesis into the 
X-efficiency and scale efficiency hypotheses. 
 The third one is the relative market power hypothesis. Shepherd (1982 and 1986) 
establishes that the variance in performance is explained by efficiency as well as by the 
residual influence of the market share, because market share captures the influence of 
factors unrelated to efficiency, such as market power and/or product differentiation. 
Under this hypothesis, individual market share is the proxy variable for assessing 
market power. 
 The quiet life hypothesis can be considered a special case of the market power 
hypothesis. This hypothesis postulates that the higher market power, the lower the effort 
of managers to maximize operating efficiency, a negative correlation thus existing 
between market power and efficiency. Up to date, in the empirical testing of this 
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hypothesis, market concentration measures are traditionally used as proxy for market 
power. 
 Berger and Hannan (1989) summarize the reasons that may explain the influence 
of market structure, as a proxy for market power, on efficiency. First, according to the 
quiet life hypothesis, if banks that compete in a market with higher concentration can 
set prices above marginal costs, managers do not have incentives to work as hard to 
keep costs under control. In other words, monopoly power allows managers to relax 
their efforts. Second, market power may allow managers to pursue objectives other than 
profit maximization (such as expense preference behavior). Third, in a non-competitive 
scenario, managers devote resources to obtaining and maintaining market power, which 
raises costs and reduces cost efficiency. And fourth, if banks enjoy market power, 
incompetent managers can survive without a wilful shirking of work efforts. 
 Only a few studies have analyzed the relationship between market power and 
efficiency in banking. For the U.S. banking industry, Berger (1995) implements tests 
that distinguish among the several hypotheses that explain the profit-structure 
relationship in banking using direct measures of efficiency. However, the relationship 
between efficiency and market power is not analyzed. Also for the U.S. banking sector, 
Berger and Hannan (1998) examine whether banks in more concentrated markets 
exhibit lower operating efficiency, and compare the efficiency cost of concentration 
with the loss measured by the welfare triangle. Results are consistent with the quiet life 
hypotheses and indicate that the efficiency costs estimated are much higher than the 
social cost occasioned by non-competitive pricing. 
 For the European banking sectors, although studies exist that test the hypotheses 
that may explain the profit-structure relationship (Molyneux et al., 1994, 1996 and 
2004; Goldberg and Rai, 1996; Maudos, 1998; Vander Vennet, 2002), as far as we 
know, there is no study that analyses the relationship between market power and 
efficiency. Therefore, to quantify this relationship, and to estimate the social loss 
derived from both market power and efficiency, are the main aims of this paper. 
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3. Methodology 
3.1 The Lerner index of market power 
 The model most often used to obtain the Lerner index of market power in 
banking is the Monti-Klein imperfect banking competition model2. This model 
examines the behavior of a monopolistic bank faced with a loan demand curve of 
negative slope L(rL) and a deposit supply of positive slope D(rD), the decision variables 
of the bank being L (volume of loans) and D (volume of deposits). For simplicity's sake 
the level of capital is assumed to be given and the bank is assumed to be price taker in 
the inter-bank market (r). As shown by Freixas and Rochet (1997), this model can be 
interpreted as a model of imperfect competition (Cournot) among a finite number of 
banks (N). Cournot’s equilibrium is the set of N vectors (D*n, L*n) n=1,….,N which 
maximize the profit of bank n, considering the volume of deposits and loans of other 
banks to be given for each n. Thus, (D*n, L*n) is the solution of the following 
optimization problem: 
( ) ( ) ( ){ }
( , )
* * ,max
n nD L
L n m n D n m nm n m n
r L L r L r r D D D C L D≠ ≠⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤+ − + − + −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦∑ ∑  (1) 
where C(·)  are the operating costs. 
 In equilibrium, each bank sets D*n=D*/N and L*n=L*/N. From the first order 
conditions, we obtain: 
* *
* * * *
1 1                            
( ) ( )ε ε
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− − − −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦= =L L D D
L L L D D D
r r mc r r mc
r N r r N r
 (2) 
where εL and εD are the elasticities of demand for loans and deposits respectively, and 
on the left hand side of each of equations (2) appears the expression of the Lerner index 
of market power for loans and for deposits, respectively. The Lerner index of market 
power defines the disparity between price (interest rate) and marginal cost (mc) 
expressed as a percent of price, taking into account that the divergence between product 
price and marginal cost of production is the essence of monopoly power. Thus, the 
Lerner Index measures the relative markup of price over marginal cost. 
 It is worth noting that according to expression (2), market power depends both 
on the elasticity of demand and on the number of firms competing in the market, which 
is usually proxied by measures of market concentration. Therefore, the advantage 
                                                 
2 Monti (1972) and Klein (1971). 
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presented by the use of the Lerner index as a market power indicator is that it captures 
the influence both of market concentration and of demand elasticity, being therefore 
preferable to the use of market concentration indicators (such as CR(n), or the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index). 
 The measurement of the Lerner index of market power requires prices and 
marginal costs to be estimated separately for loans and for deposits. In the first case, 
yearly averages of loan (deposit) interest rates for each bank were imputed from ratios 
of loan revenues (financial costs) to outstanding loan (deposit) values. In the second 
case, and bearing in mind that one of the objectives of the study is to analyze the 
relationship between X-efficiency and market power, marginal operating costs are 
estimated from a frontier translog cost function. 
3.2 The welfare triangle 
As Oroz and Salas (2003) and Fernández de Guevara et al. (2005) demonstrate, 
the Lerner index offers a proxy of the welfare loss due to market power. As figure 1 
shows, assuming a linear loan (deposit) demand (supply) function and constant 
marginal cost, the loss in the consumer's surplus due to imperfect competition with 
respect to the situation of perfect competition is the area acde (fihj), while the gain in 
the producer’s surplus is the area abde (fghj). Thus, the net social loss associated with 
misallocation of resources attributable to market power is the area abc (ghi), the so-
called welfare or Harberger’s triangle. This triangle shows the loss due to increasing the 
price from the competitive level to the monopoly price. If we express this social loss per 
unit of revenue (rLL) – or unit of cost (rDD) - the welfare triangle is proportional to the 
Lerner index3: 
 * *
* *
* * * * * *
1 1                    
2 2
− − − −∆ ∆= =L DL D
L L D D
r r mc r r mcabc gih
r L r r D r
 (3) 
The total welfare loss can be expressed as a percentage of GDP: 
1
2
⎡ ⎤− − − −= +⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
* *
* *
L D* * * *L D
L D* *
L D
r r mc r r mcWelfare loss r L r D
GDP GDP r r
  (4) 
 
                                                 
3 Fernández de Guevera and Maudos (2004) adopt a different approach. They measure 
the welfare loss attributable to market power, adding the loss of consumer surplus. 
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3.3 X-Efficiency 
 Efficiency is measured using the concept of X-(in)efficiency and is regarded as a 
measure of the quality of management. The concept of cost efficiency measures the   
distance of a bank’s cost relative to the cost of the best practice bank when both banks 
produce the same output under the same conditions.  
 We estimate X-inefficiency using the stochastic frontier approach proposed by 
Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977). This approach modifies 
the standard cost function by assuming that inefficiency forms part of the error term. 
Thus, the error term has two components. The first error component (v) is symmetric 
and captures the random variation of the frontier across firms, i.e. statistical noise, 
measurement error, and random shocks that are external to the firm’s control. The 
second error component (u) is a one-sided variable that captures inefficiency relative to 
the frontier. Following Jondrow et al. (1982), bank-specific estimates of inefficiency 
terms can be calculated by using the distribution of the inefficiency term conditional to 
the estimate of the composite error term. We assume that the inefficiency term is drawn 
from a half-normal distribution. The resulting cost efficiency ratio may be thought of as 
the proportion of costs or resources that are used efficiently. For example, a bank with a 
cost efficiency of 0.85 is 85 per cent efficient or, equivalently, wastes 15 per cent of its 
costs relative to a best practice bank facing the same conditions (same output). 
 Taking into account that the aim of the paper is to analyze the quiet life 
hypothesis which relates market power to managers’ efforts to control operating costs, 
the cost function we estimate excludes financial costs and, therefore, the price of 
deposits. Thus, the cost function, and hence the efficiencies estimated, include only 
operating expenses. If financial costs (and the price of deposits) were included in the 
cost function, efficiency cost would capture the effect of market power in the deposit 
market, and, since we aim to analyze the effect of market power on efficiency, it will 
bias our results.  
We estimate a translog frontier cost function, where operating costs (c) depend 
on two outputs (L=loans, and D=deposits), two input prices (w1=price of labor and 
w2= price of physical capital) and technical change (Trend): 
                                                                                                                                               
However, from a social point of view, the loss of consumer surplus is appropriated by 
banks in form of extraordinary profits. 
 10
2 2
2
1 2
1ln ln ln ln ln ln ln ln
2
1 1(ln ) (ln ) ln ln ln ln
2 2
1 ln ln
2
ln
it h hit L it D it hm hit mit LD it it
LL it DD it hit it hit ithL hD
L it D it
hit it ith
c w L D w w L D
L D w L w D
Trend Trend Trend L Trend D
Trend w v u
γ γ γ γ γ
γ γ γ γ
µ µ µ µ
µ
= + + + +
+ + + +
+ + + +
+ + +
∑ ∑∑
∑ ∑
∑
 (5) 
Observe that a time dummy variable is specified to capture the effect of 
technical change. Symmetry and linear homogeneity in input prices restrictions are 
imposed. According to this expression, operating marginal costs for loans and deposits 
are given by the following equations: 
 ln ln ln
it
it it
L L LL it hit LD it LhL
it it
c cmc L w D Trend
L L
γ γ γ γ µ∂ ⎡ ⎤= = + + + +⎣ ⎦∂ ∑  (6) 
ln ln ln
it
it it
D D DD it hit LD it DhD
it it
c cmc D w L Trend
D D
γ γ γ γ µ∂ ⎡ ⎤= = + + + +⎣ ⎦∂ ∑   
 Cross-country comparison of cost efficiency requires estimation of a common 
cost efficiency frontier for all banks of the sample used. However, as some papers argue 
(DeYoung, 1998; Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas, 2000; Lozano et al., 2002), when 
analyzing bank efficiency, it is important to allow for variation in environmental 
conditions which are beyond the control of bank managers. With this aim, we introduce 
into equation (5) some environmental variables (macroeconomic performance, 
economic development, population density, and banking services) that reflect how a 
bank's economic environment can help to explain cost efficiency differences among 
countries. More precisely, we control for the influence of: 
 -Per capita income, defined as the ratio of the Gross Domestic Product in real 
terms to the number of inhabitants (GDP/POP). This variable affects numerous factors 
related to the demand and supply of banking services (mainly deposits and loans). 
Additionally, this variable is used as an overall indicator of institutional development. 
 -The population density is measured by the ratio of inhabitants per square 
kilometer (POP/Km2). It is expected to have a negative influence on operating costs 
since high levels of population density should make retail distribution of banking 
services less costly, which should improve cost efficiency. 
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 -Branches per capita (BR/POP) is an indicator of banking services. High levels 
of BR/POP imply high costs of providing banking services, which should reduce bank 
efficiency. 
 -Real GDP growth (GDPGR) is the annual rate of growth of GDP. This variable 
is introduced to capture the possible effect of the business cycle. 
 -Additionally, dummy variables for each country are included to take into 
account the influence of other remaining potential variables which are specific to each 
banking sector (e.g. regulatory and/or institutional variables). 
 
4. Market power and welfare loss: empirical results 
 Bank data were obtained from BankScope (Bureau Van Dijk) database. The 
sample consists of a total of 29,744 observations of non-consolidated banking firms 
during the period 1993-2002. The banking sectors analyzed are those of the 15 countries 
of the European Union. The unbalanced panel data covers around 75% of bank assets 
included in the BankScope database in the European Union. It includes commercial 
banks, cooperative banks, savings banks and other types of institutions. Banks with 
missing data needed for estimating marginal costs and/or interest rates were not 
included. Additionally, banks with input prices and/or computed loan and deposit 
interest rates that were outside the interval of +/- 2.5 times the relevant standard 
deviation were dropped from the sample.  
 To estimate Lerner indices it is necessary to know the output prices that are 
included in the cost function. For this reason, and conditioned by the limited degree of 
dissagregation of the information contained in the data base used, the banking outputs 
considered were reduced to two broad aggregates from the balance sheet, one on the 
assets side and another on the liabilities. Thus, bank outputs are loans (proxied by total 
earning assets) and deposits (proxied by customer and short term funding). Input prices 
(w) are w1= price of labor (personnel costs / total assets4) and w2= price of capital 
(operating costs except personnel costs / fixed assets). The loan interest rate (rL) is 
computed as the ratio of interest income and other operating income divided by loans. 
The deposit interest rate (rD) is computed as the ratio of interest expenses/deposits. The 
money market rate is proxied by the yearly average of the three month inter-bank 
deposit rate (reported by the Bank of Spain for the fifteen EU countries). The total 
                                                 
4 As data on the number of employees are not available in BankScope database, the 
price of labor is measured by the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets. 
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volume of loans and deposits for each country needed to compute the welfare triangle 
(see expression 4) is taken from the European Central Bank (2004). 
 Bank market concentration is measured by the Herfindahl-Hirshman index 
(HHI). For each country and year, concentration is computed using bank-level data from 
the BankScope database. Considering that concentration is a characteristic of the 
market, the HHI is computed as the squared sum of the market shares of all banks 
existing in a country in the whole BankScope database, not only in our sample. 
Environmental variables come from different statistical sources: (GDP/POP) and 
GDPGR are obtained from the OECD’s National Accounts; (BR/POP) comes from 
Bank Profitability (OECD) completed with the European Central Bank’s Blue Book on 
payment statistics and National Accounts (OECD); (POP/Km2) is obtained from 
National Accounts (OECD) and NewCronoss (Eurostat). Table 1 contains the 
descriptive statistics of the variable used in the paper. 
 The evolution of interest rates, marginal costs and absolute margins are reported 
in table 2. Loan and deposit interest rates have decreased in all countries, in a context of 
reduction of inflation and nominal convergence among countries. Nominal convergence 
has accelerated in recent years as a consequence of the adoption of the euro in the 
European Monetary Union. Estimated marginal costs of loans are higher than those of 
deposits with relatively stable behavior in the period analyzed. Deposit marginal costs 
have decreased in almost all countries (with the exception of Austria, Belgium and 
Greece).  
 The evolution of loan (rL – r – mcL ) and deposit (r – rD –  mcD) absolute margins 
are shown in the last column of table 2. Loan margins rose over the period in the 
majority of countries (from 0.7% in 1993 to 2.1% in 2002 for the average of the EU15) 
while deposit margins fell. This suggests that market power may have increased in loan 
markets while falling in deposit markets. In recent years (1997-2002), margins were 
negative in the deposit market, suggesting a loss leader pricing strategy: although 
deposits may not be profitable by themselves, they allow banks to capture customers, 
and banks can exercise market power in the loans market. 
 Table 3 shows the evolution of the Lerner index of market power for each of the 
EU15 countries, and for the EU15 weighted average. Market power has increased in the 
loans market in all the European banking sectors with the exception of Sweden and the 
United Kingdom. In 2002, the highest values of the index correspond to Luxembourg 
(0.51) and Portugal (0.46), which together with France, Germany, Greece, Italy, 
Netherlands and Spain are situated above the average of the EU15 (0.32). At the 
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opposite extreme are the UK and Sweden, with low levels of market power in the loans 
market. 
In deposits, market power has decreased in all countries except in Finland, 
Sweden and the UK. Furthermore, from the mid-1990s, the Lerner index is negative in 
almost every country. The fact of finding negative margins in the deposit market is not 
driven by the level of marginal operating costs, but by the spread between the money 
market rate and the deposit interest rate (r – rD), which is negative in most European 
banking sectors. As we have mentioned above, this suggests a loss leader pricing 
strategy in the deposit market5. Furthermore, the negative margins in deposits also 
reflect the competition of other financial liabilities such as mutual funds. On the assets 
side, loans remain the principal source of finance for certain segments, especially where 
relationships are more important (small firms or households), being, therefore, less 
subject to the competition of other financial intermediaries or markets. 
With this estimation of the Lerner index as a base, we can compute the social 
loss due to misallocation of resources attributable to market power from expression (4). 
Our measure comprises the loss of consumer and producer surplus occasioned by non-
competitive pricing (the welfare triangle). Table 4 shows the welfare loss associated 
with imperfect competition as a percentage of GDP. The evolution of the EU15 average 
suggests that in the period between 1993 and 2002, there was a downward trend in the 
welfare loss attributabled to market power broken down in the last years. Whereas in 
1993 the social loss of market power was 0.54% of GDP, it decreased to a 0.27% of 
GDP in 2000, showing a sharp increase since then, and recovering the initial level of 
0.54% of GDP in 2002. Given the differences in the evolution of market power of loans 
and deposits, the evolution of the welfare loss is due to the combination of market 
power exercised in the loan and deposits markets, counteracting the effects of the latter 
on the former until 2000. So, it seems that the loss leader strategy adopted by European 
banks by which banks set interest spreads under their marginal costs in the deposits 
markets -so that they can establish a relationship with the client which allows banks to 
exercise market power in loans-, was not only profitable for banks, but also for society 
as a whole given the reduction of social losses until 2000. Since then the effects of 
greater market power in the loan markets have dominated generating higher social 
losses.  
                                                 
5 For the Spanish case, results are similar to those reported in Carbó et al. (2005), who 
analyse the intensity of price and non-price (branches) competition over the 1986-2002 
period. Their results show that market power has increased in the loan markets while 
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The data also show that there is substantial variability in the indicator across 
countries. Thus, in 2002, and apart from Luxembourg - whose high social efficiency is 
driven by the importance of the banking sector in the economy6 - countries with welfare 
losses over 1% of GDP such as Denmark (1.1), Spain (1.4), Portugal (1.6) and Ireland 
(1.8) coexist with countries with losses below 0.5% such as United Kingdom (0.4), 
Netherlands (0.3), Belgium (0.3) and specially France (0.03). When interpreting these 
results, one must note that the value and the evolution of the social inefficiency of 
banking intermediation depend on two factors (see expression 4): the evolution of 
market power (Lerner index) and the evolution of the ratio of banking assets (loans and 
deposits)/GDP. Thus, in some countries the magnitude of the welfare loss is due more 
to the banking orientation of the financial structures in each country rather than to the 
market power of banks. Furthermore, it is of concern to observe a high degree of bank 
market power in countries that are strongly orientated towards bank financing, such as 
Ireland, Portugal and Spain. 
The estimates of the welfare loss triangle are lower than the values reported by 
Fernández de Guevara and Maudos (2004) for the period 1993-2000. Thus, taking as 
reference their estimation for 2000, the loss of welfare associated with imperfect 
competition is 2.51% of GDP for the average of the EU15, as against the 0.27% 
obtained in this study. Several factors can help to explain these differences. Firstly, the 
welfare loss estimated in Fernández de Guevara and Maudos (2004) incorporates, as 
well as Harberger´s welfare triangle, the loss of consumer surplus that is appropriated 
by the producer in form of extra profits. Secondly, Fernández de Guevara and Maudos 
(2004) use a single indicator of banking activity (proxied by total assets) and, 
consequently, a single indicator of market power. Taking into account that the levels of 
market power are very different in the loan and deposit markets, the use of a single 
indicator of market power could bias the estimated value of welfare loss. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
falling in deposit markets. They also found that in the 1997-2002 period, margins were 
negative in the Spanish deposits market. 
6 According to the European Central Bank (ECB, 2004), in Luxembourg, the ratio of 
deposits (from non-credit institutions) / GDP in 2002 was 9 whereas in loans (to non-
credit institutions) “only” 5, thus dominating the effect of the negative Lerner index in 
the deposit market power over the degree of market power in the loan market. 
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5. The relationship between market power and efficiency: empirical results 
 In this section we present the results regarding the relationship between market 
power and efficiency in the European banking sectors. Having analyzed the evolution of 
market power in section 4, we now turn to the study of cost efficiency.  
 Table 5 shows the mean efficiency scores, estimated by the stochastic frontier 
approach. Average cost efficiency is quite stable and ranges around an average level of 
85%, which is in accordance with former studies of the EU (Maudos et al., 2002; 
Altunbas et al., 2001)7. If we take as reference the last year analyzed, Finland (93.2%), 
Ireland (91.9%) and the United Kingdom (89.9%) are the most efficient banking 
sectors, while the most inefficient are Portugal (74%), Belgium (77.6%) and 
Luxembourg (80%). If we focus on the evolution over time, there are important 
differences among countries, efficiency cost increasing in seven of the EU15 countries. 
 Just as the existence of market power implies a loss of welfare, the inefficiency 
of banking institutions is also a cost for society. According to Maudos and Fernández de 
Guevara (2004), banks establish their margins as a function of the operating costs they 
have to bear. Thus, these authors obtain a high elasticity of banking margins against 
levels of efficiency. It can thus be understood that in the final instance, it is the 
consumer of banking services that have to pay the costs of the operating inefficiency of 
banking institutions. We can, therefore, compare the social loss of market power with 
the costs for society represented by the inefficiency of the banks. Table 6 shows, as a 
percentage of GDP, the difference between the minimum costs of production that define 
the frontier of efficient behavior, and the effective costs incurred by European banking 
institutions. For the European Union as a whole, the social cost of bank inefficiency 
increased slightly from 0.34% in 1993 to 0.4% of GDP in 2002 as was to be expected in 
view of the slight downturn of cost efficiency levels during the period analyzed. By 
countries, it can be seen that the highest losses associated with inefficiency are found in 
Luxembourg (2.4%), Belgium (1.1%), Portugal (0.6%) and France (0.5%), while in 
2002 the lowest losses of efficiency are observed in Ireland (0.007%), Finland (0.1%), 
United Kingdom (0,12%) and Sweden (0.16%).  
 If we compare the levels of social welfare loss derived from market power (table 
4) with the magnitude of welfare loss associated to banks´ cost inefficiency (table 6), we 
can see that, in general, the social welfare losses derived from market power are greater 
                                                 
7 Averaging the results of 130 studies across five different types of frontier approaches 
for 21 countries suggests that average cost inefficiency in various nations' banking 
industries is 20% to 25%. See Berger and Humphrey (1997). 
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than those from X-inefficiency. Thus, in 2002, the former was 0.54% of GDP, in 
contrast to the 0.4% of X-inefficiency8. On average, over the period, social losses 
derived from market power are a 23% higher than that of X-inefficiency. 
 Once we have computed the social loss from both the level of market power and 
cost efficiency we focus on the relationship between them. According to the quiet life 
hypothesis, part of the level of inefficiency is caused by market power. To test the 
validity of the quiet life hypothesis for the European banks, we estimate an equation 
where the dependent variable is cost efficiency and the independent variables are the 
Lerner index and other variables that potentially influence bank efficiency. These 
factors include both bank and country characteristics that may be associated with 
managerial decisions. Specifically, the explanatory variables of cost efficiency are the 
following: 
 -Concentration: traditionally, studies use market concentration measures as 
proxy variables for market power. For that reason, we also use market concentration 
(HHI) as a first proxy variable for competition. Since no information is available on 
banking activities in European local markets, our measures of concentration are 
calculated at a national level. Initially, the HHI is measured in terms of total assets 
(HHIA) to check the similarities with the results of Berger and Hannan (1998). 
Alternatively, taking into account the evidence offered before, and the results of 
Corvoisier and Gropp (2002) and Fernández de Guevara et al. (2005) in which the 
effect of concentration is different in different banking products, the HHI is used in 
terms of loans (HHIL) and deposits (HHID). However, some recent papers show the 
limitations of using concentration measures to proxy for the competition environment in 
banking markets (Berger et al., 2003; Fernández de Guevera et al. 2005a; Claessens and 
Laeven; 2004). Moreover, the relationship between the level of competition and 
concentration is not straightforward and depends on the conduct of the banks in the 
market. As Shaffer (2004) shows, in a concentrated market different competitive 
equilibria can be obtained depending on the conduct of banks in markets. Consequently, 
as our preferred alternative to concentration ratios, we use the Lerner index as a direct 
measure of competition. 
-Market power: to test the effect of market power on managers’ efforts to control 
operating costs, the Lerner index is introduced as a determinant of cost efficiency. A 
negative influence of cost efficiency would favor the quiet life hypothesis. 
                                                 
8 An exceptional case is that of France, where the high level of competition causes 
losses of cost efficiency being greater than those of market power. 
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 -Size: the size of each bank, measured by total assets (TA), is included to test if 
larger banks are able to get better management than smaller ones. Berger and 
Humphrey´s (1997) review article concludes that there is consistent evidence that larger 
banks tend to be more efficient than small ones. 
 -Specialization (S): we distinguish four types of banking specialization: 
commercial bank (S1), savings bank (S2), cooperative bank (S3), and others 
(investment bank, medium-and long term credit bank, real estate/mortgage bank, 
specialized government credit institution, etc). Dummy variables (which take the value 
1 when the bank adopts specialization and 0 otherwise) are used to control for the 
possible influence of institutional specialization on cost efficiency9. 
 The regression model is the following: 
(  , ln( ), )it it itEF f Market power TA S=  (7) 
where i=bank, t=year, EF is the level of efficiency and market power is, alternatively, 
the HHI concentration index or the Lerner index.  
 Since operating cost efficiency (our dependent variable) is a variable bounded 
between zero and one, it is necessary to use a non-linear specification of the functional 
form f, rather than a linear regression model. Using in equation (7) the logistic 
functional form 
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which can be easily linearized via the logit transformation as follows, 
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 Table 7 reports the results of the estimation of expression (9). This equation was 
estimated introducing both individual fixed effects and time effect. Column (1) shows 
results using market concentration in terms of total assets (HHIA) as a proxy variable 
for market power. The coefficient of the HHA is negative but not statistically different 
from zero. The sign -although not the significance- is similar to the result of Berger and 
Hannan (1998) showing evidence in favor of the quiet life hypothesis. However, if we 
introduce the effect of concentration in the loan and deposit market (column 2), the 
                                                 
9 S4 (other type of institutions) is the group of reference in the estimations. 
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influence is positive and statistically significant in the loan market and negative in the 
deposit market. This result implies that operating in more concentrated markets is 
associated with less cost efficiency in the deposit market but with more efficiency in the 
loan market. As in Corvoisier and Gropp (2002) and Fernández de Guevara et al. 
(2005), this result shows the importance of distinguishing the effect of concentration by 
type of product, as done in this paper. Thus, the results, though they support the quiet 
life hypothesis in the deposit market, allow us to reject this hypothesis in the loan 
market, as banks in more concentrated loan markets exhibit higher (and not lower) cost 
efficiency. This result must be taken with caution. As we have mentioned before, 
concentration indices have been calculated at national level, whereas by the nature of 
banking services, competition takes place at a lower than national level. 
 Table 7 also shows the elasticities of cost efficiency w.r.t. changes in the 
explanatory variables. In terms of economic impact, a 100% increase in the HHI in the 
loan (deposit) market would cause efficiency to increase (decrease) by 0.99% (0.86%). 
Thus, an increase in loan market concentration from that of the least concentrated 
European loan market (HHL=180.42 in Germany in 2002) to that of the most 
concentrated market (HHL=2,384.4 in Finland), would increase cost efficiency by 9%. 
In the deposit market, an increase in market concentration from the minimum value 
corresponding to Germany (188.28) to the maximum of the Netherlands (3,196.2), 
would decrease efficiency by 12%.  
 Regarding the rest of the explanatory variables of cost efficiency, size has a 
positive and statistically significant influence on efficiency, indicating that larger banks 
are more cost efficient. Its economic impact is larger than that of concentration, 
showing an elasticity of 1.85. Thus, if a bank duplicates its size (a 100% increase), its 
cost efficiency would increase by 1.85%. With increasing returns to scale, greater size 
may increase bank efficiency through more efficient scale. The type of banking 
specialization does not seem to influence banks’ efficiency, since none of the dummy 
variables representing specialization is statistically significant.  
 As we have mentioned above, recent studies have shown the limitation of using 
market concentration measures to proxy for the degree of competition in the markets. 
For that reason, and because it is impossible for us to calculate HHI indices at a lower 
than national level, column (3) of table 7 shows results using the Lerner index as proxy 
for competition. In this case, the results show that the coefficient of the Lerner index, in 
the loan market as well as in the deposit market, is statistically positive (at 1% level), 
which indicates the existence of a negative relationship between competition and cost 
efficiency in the European banking sectors. In terms of economic impact, a 100% 
increase in the Lerner index in the loan (deposit) market would produce an increase of 
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0.29% (0.05%) in cost efficiency. In respect of the influence of the rest of the 
explanatory variables of efficiency, the results are similar to those corresponding to 
column (2). 
 The difference of results obtained, in terms of the impact on efficiency, between 
market concentration and Lerner index, shows the existence of a low relationship 
between the two variables. In fact, the correlation coefficient between the Lerner index 
and the HH index is -0.07 in the loan market and 0.07 in the deposit market, and is not 
statistically significant in either case. Therefore, the absence of correlation between the 
Lerner index and the HH index, as well as their different influence on cost efficiency, 
shows the limitations of market concentration measures as proxy variables for 
competition. 
 These results permit us to reject the quiet life hypothesis in the European 
banking system. There may be several reasons explaining the positive effect of market 
power on efficiency. Firstly, as Pertersen and Rajan (1995) argue, banks with 
monopolistic power due to their location (close to the firms) have lower costs of 
monitoring and transacting with firms10. Secondly, banks that possess market power due 
to geographical or technological specialization may have cost advantages in screening 
certain groups of borrowers (Kaas, 2004). Thirdly, market power allows banks to enjoy 
greater profits, which may create incentives to behave prudently (enhancing bank 
stability). This more prudent behavior leads to the selection of less risky activities with 
lower costs of monitoring, therefore increasing cost efficiency. And fourthly, the banks 
that enjoy greater market power are under less pressure to increase the quality of 
banking services (less availability of means of payment, worse attention to customers, 
etc.), thus decreasing operating cost and increasing their cost efficiency. 
 Having reached this point, it is of interest to value the effects of economic policy 
measures aimed at increasing competitive rivalry in European banking markets. This 
poses the following questions. Firstly, what would be the gain in terms of social welfare 
if market power decreased in the European banking sectors where there is least 
competitive rivalry?. But in the light of the results obtained, this hypothetical reduction 
of market power would generate an increase in X-inefficiency that increases the banking 
margins borne by the consumers of banking services (Maudos and Fernández de 
Guevara, 2004). Secondly, therefore, what would be the potential loss of welfare 
                                                 
10 The theoretical contribution of Sussman and Zeira (1995) show that banks´ 
monitoring costs increase in distance. 
 
 20
associated with the cost inefficiency of European banks, given the positive relationship 
found between market power and cost efficiency? 
 The reduction of cost efficiency associated with a decrease of market power can 
be quantified using the regression coefficient of the Lerner index (table 7, column 3) 
and the evolution of the values of the Lerner index (table 2). Once this loss has been 
quantified, the second step is to compare its magnitude with the reduction of the social 
welfare loss associated with less market power. If the increase in social welfare is 
greater than the loss of cost efficiency, economic policy initiatives must be aimed at 
reducing the market power of the banks, as the cost of such policies in terms of loss of 
cost efficiency (which would be translated into higher banking margins) is lower than 
the gains in the social efficiency of financial intermediation.  
 To be able to carry out this exercise it is necessary to make some assumptions as 
to the evolution of market power and thus to quantify its impact on welfare and the level 
of efficiency. Specifically, we will assume that market power in the credit and deposit 
markets decreases up to the observed EU15 average in those banking sectors in which 
the value of the Lerner index is greater than this average, remaining at the current values 
in the other countries. 
 Table 8 shows the reduction of the welfare loss triangle associated with the 
assumption of reduction in market power. In the table, the social welfare gain is 
quantified as a percentage of the GDP for each country and year of the sample, as well 
as for the weighted average of the EU15. If we focus on the last year analyzed (2002), 
the social welfare gain due to the decrease in market power represents 0.32% of GDP. 
With the exception of Luxembourg (whose high gain is explained by the high relative 
importance of the banking sector), the gains vary between values higher than 0.5% of 
GDP (0.6 in Spain, 0.8% in Portugal, and 0.9 in Ireland and United Kingdom) and 
values lower to 0.2% (Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Germany and France). 
 The cost efficiency loss associated with the reduction of market power in the 
banking sectors with Lerner indices above the EU average appears in table 9. The 
elasticities of efficiency against changes in the Lerner index shown in table 7 are used to 
calculate the impact on efficiency of the variation in the level of competition in loans 
and deposits markets. As a percentage of GDP, the increase in cost inefficiency is only 
0.0014% for the average of the EU15 in 2002, the loss being very small in practically 
all European countries. The only exception is the loss of efficiency of Luxembourg 
(0.018%) as a consequence of the importance of banking assets. 
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 The comparison of the results of tables 8 and 9 shows that the welfare gains 
associated with the fall of market power are much greater than the loss of bank cost 
efficiency. Consequently, from a social point of view, the economic policy measures 
adopted by the different European institutions with banking competencies (European 
Commission, European Parliament, European Central Bank, national Ministries of 
Economy, Antitrust authorities, etc.) must be aimed at eliminating all kinds of barriers 
or obstacles to banking competition, given the magnitude of the potential effect of such 
measures on social welfare. In this respect, we might highlight the current Financial 
Services Action Plan of the European Commission, which incorporates 42 measures 
aiming to create a single European financial market.  
For the U.S. banking industry, the results of Berger and Hannan (1998) support 
the quiet life hypothesis: the additional operating costs attributable to market power 
appear to be several times larger than the social loss due to the non-competitive pricing 
of bank outputs, as measured by the welfare triangle. As well as the difference in the 
sample used (U.S. vs. European banks), there are two main reasons that may justify the 
discrepancy with the evidence that we have obtained in this study. Firstly, we use the 
Lerner index as market power indicator, given the advantages that it presents over the 
use of market concentration ratios, especially when market concentration indices cannot 
be calculated at local level. And secondly, our empirical approach to the measurement 
of the welfare triangle loss does not need to make assumptions as to the proportional 
increase in price owing to the exercise of market power or as to demand price 
elasticities. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 This paper estimates the two paths by which market power affects social 
welfare. On the one hand, greater market power implies a loss of social welfare (the so-
called welfare triangle). On the other hand, market power may influence the efforts of 
managers to control costs and, consequently, cost efficiency (quiet life hypothesis). 
With this aim, the paper examines the relationship between market power (proxied by 
the Lerner index) and cost efficiency (proxied by X-efficiency measures) in banking. 
Furthermore, this paper is the first one to estimate Lerner indices of market power for 
different banking products, namely loans and deposits, in the European Union banking 
sectors. 
 The results referring to the banking sectors of the European Union-15 over the 
period 1993-2002, show that while market power increased in the loan market, it 
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decreased in the deposit market. The results also show that margins are negative in the 
deposit market, suggesting that banks follow a loss leader pricing strategy. The welfare 
loss (Harberger´s triangle) from the misallocation of resources attributable to market 
power represented 0.54% of the GDP of the European Union in 2002, substantial 
variability existing across countries.  
Given the limitations presented by the use of market concentration measures as 
proxy variables for bank competition, we tested the quiet life hypothesis by examining 
the relationship between cost efficiency and the Lerner index. The results show the 
existence of a positive relationship between market power and cost efficiency, 
permitting the rejection of the quiet life hypothesis. The lower pressure from 
competition to increase the quality of banking services, together with lower monitoring 
and screening costs, may explain the negative relationship between competition and 
efficiency. 
Although a reduction in market power decreases the size of the social loss from 
mispricing of bank outputs, it decreases the cost efficiency of the banking system, 
posing the question of its net impact for society. The simulation carried out under the 
assumption that the degree of competition increases in the European banking sectors 
that enjoy a level of market power above the average for the European Union shows that 
the welfare gains associated with the fall of market power are much greater than the loss 
of bank cost efficiency. This result shows the relevance of economic policy measures 
(such as the Financial Services Action Plan of the European Commission) aimed at 
removing the barriers or obstacles that protect national markets from outside 
competition (different taxation of banking products among countries, differences in 
regulation and supervision, entry barriers that hinder cross-border banking penetration,  
etc). 
Finally, the discrepancy of our results from those obtained by Berger and 
Hannan (1998) for the U.S. banking industry show the need for additional empirical 
evidence referring to other banking sectors, because, as far as we know, there are hardly 
any studies that estimate the costs of market power, whether in terms of social welfare 
or in terms of bank cost efficiency. 
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Table 1. Sample statistics of variables
c L D w1 w2 r L r D r GDPGR GDP/POP BR/POP POP/Km
2
HHIA HHIL HHID LA BANKS
AUSTRIA 1.54 95.12 77.88 0.95 88.56 9.18 6.81 6.77 0.42 19.99 0.59 0.10 687.00 741.81 812.51 6.68 57
BELGIUM 1.46 95.77 85.98 0.92 74.99 9.57 7.34 8.09 -0.96 18.72 1.97 0.30 838.93 1,057.49 884.82 6.85 62
DENMARK 2.35 95.14 84.71 1.44 50.72 12.46 6.78 10.08 0.00 24.65 0.45 0.12 1,442.12 1,741.50 2,232.22 6.22 70
FINLAND 2.08 88.73 73.01 0.86 72.44 9.92 7.11 7.55 -1.24 17.48 0.43 0.01 1,854.48 2,489.68 2,588.74 7.08 4
FRANCE 1.68 92.86 80.71 0.95 102.49 9.66 7.17 8.28 -0.89 18.73 0.45 0.11 399.45 431.35 507.48 6.97 264
GERMANY 1.62 96.59 75.82 1.00 73.22 9.50 6.79 7.19 -1.09 20.24 0.55 0.23 197.41 213.89 172.63 6.38 1,164
GREECE 2.12 91.43 85.37 1.50 47.60 14.63 12.23 22.90 -1.60 8.71 0.11 0.08 2,142.90 3,137.13 1,797.41 6.63 17
IRELAND 2.25 95.90 88.33 1.16 40.52 12.90 6.44 8.61 2.69 14.36 - 0.05 1,787.41 2,099.22 1,862.45 6.34 5
ITALY 2.77 90.55 79.62 1.66 50.24 13.13 7.69 10.11 -0.88 16.29 0.37 0.19 455.57 309.57 356.56 6.67 222
LUXEMBOURG 0.86 96.75 88.97 0.45 72.98 9.58 8.37 8.09 4.20 33.26 0.77 0.15 291.79 359.22 303.42 6.36 72
NETHERLANDS 2.03 95.10 86.65 0.83 97.80 8.76 5.98 6.73 0.65 19.04 0.47 0.37 1,651.48 1,962.55 2,413.53 6.20 19
PORTUGAL 2.48 84.13 85.12 1.40 42.58 16.40 9.08 12.63 -2.04 8.39 0.29 0.11 916.83 700.30 846.87 6.54 28
SPAIN 2.55 92.74 88.56 1.56 35.20 14.17 7.95 11.69 -1.03 11.31 0.90 0.08 517.71 463.24 459.24 6.75 115
SWEDEN 2.25 92.85 77.29 1.02 231.61 13.26 8.41 8.50 -2.00 21.61 0.32 0.02 1,198.07 1,210.24 1,938.01 7.28 6
UK 2.27 91.99 83.01 1.26 88.25 9.79 5.69 5.71 2.33 19.92 0.20 0.24 663.83 754.90 738.82 6.99 90
AUSTRIA 1.73 95.39 77.68 0.94 68.23 6.52 3.36 3.27 1.37 24.15 0.53 0.10 415.42 367.80 378.59 6.19 133
BELGIUM 1.50 91.48 82.18 0.76 77.81 6.10 3.56 3.30 0.70 22.40 1.08 0.31 1,601.10 1,645.31 1,678.35 7.38 34
DENMARK 1.41 86.97 67.59 0.86 90.85 6.15 3.17 3.30 1.02 30.19 0.38 0.12 1,228.52 1,111.92 2,176.85 6.64 70
FINLAND 1.55 92.89 79.86 0.75 129.09 6.39 2.61 3.21 2.27 23.83 0.25 0.02 2,604.78 2,384.40 2,867.61 7.53 4
FRANCE 1.44 90.09 72.39 0.81 107.54 6.64 5.35 3.30 1.18 22.07 0.38 0.11 498.84 489.94 486.32 7.29 199
GERMANY 1.29 96.46 76.57 0.69 90.56 6.48 4.40 3.28 0.08 22.88 0.43 0.23 199.88 180.42 188.28 6.52 1,329
GREECE 2.27 95.37 89.94 1.38 55.90 7.74 2.92 3.30 3.63 11.20 0.28 0.08 1,715.03 1,445.92 1,762.55 7.00 14
IRELAND 0.70 98.43 91.89 0.32 46.42 6.15 3.12 3.30 6.13 27.21 0.28 0.06 742.49 872.14 821.98 6.57 4
ITALY 2.21 90.00 64.39 1.22 87.19 7.82 3.51 3.30 0.36 18.93 0.51 0.19 352.20 316.73 302.56 6.57 486
LUXEMBOURG 0.80 95.16 78.18 0.41 83.63 8.03 7.96 3.30 2.47 45.72 0.62 0.17 403.07 717.46 427.56 6.78 57
NETHERLANDS 1.13 96.46 66.40 0.64 73.40 6.87 5.74 3.30 0.57 23.41 - 0.39 1,500.56 1,207.29 3,196.21 6.65 15
PORTUGAL 1.70 88.20 79.43 0.74 80.54 8.37 4.67 3.29 0.38 10.47 0.48 0.11 1,377.50 1,572.55 1,607.46 6.88 22
SPAIN 1.78 91.88 79.20 1.07 47.77 7.48 2.85 3.31 2.04 14.54 0.95 0.08 599.12 513.99 565.94 7.03 112
SWEDEN 1.58 87.87 76.31 0.83 328.52 6.91 3.53 4.12 2.10 27.66 0.21 0.02 1,078.44 1,046.96 1,600.39 6.42 91
UK 1.50 93.31 78.69 0.81 145.32 5.12 2.65 3.97 1.64 25.22 0.18 0.24 408.45 555.27 482.30 7.09 106
c = Operating costs (% of total assets). Source: BankScope (Bureau Van Dijk)
L =Loans (total earning assets)  (% of total assets). Source: BankScope (Bureau Van Dijk)
D =Deposits (customer and short term funding)  (% of total assets). Source: BankScope (Bureau Van Dijk)
w1 =Price of labor (Personnel expenses / Total Assets) %. Source: BankScope (Bureau Van Dijk)
w2 =Price of capital  (Non-personnel operating expenses / Fixed assets) %. Source: BankScope (Bureau Van Dijk)
r L = Loans' interest rate (Interest income and other operating income / L) %. Source: BankScope (Bureau Van Dijk)
r D =Deposits' interest rate (Interest expenses / D) %. Source: BankScope (Bureau Van Dijk)
r =Interbank interest rate %. Source: Bank of Spain
GDPGR= Growth of GDP %. Source: National Accounts (OECD)
GDP/POP=Per capita GDP (Thousand of constant US $). Source: National Accounts (OECD)
BR/POP= Branches per poplulation (Branches per thusand people). Source: Bank Profitability and National Accounts (OECD)
POP/Km2=Population / Extension (Thousand people / Km2). Source: National Accounts (OECD) and New Cronoss (Eurostat)
HHIA= Herfindahl index in total assets (calculated at national level). Source BankScope (Bureau Van Dijk)
HHIL= Herfindahl index in the loan market (calculated at national level). Source BankScope (Bureau Van Dijk)
HHID= Herfindahl index in the deposit market (calculated at national level). Source BankScope (Bureau Van Dijk)
LA= Log of average total assets (in thousand of US $) in sample.  Source: BankScope (Bureau Van Dijk)
BANKS= Number of banks in sample
1993
2002
Banks of Ireland in 1993 and 1994 and the Netherlands in 2001 and 2002 have not been included in the sample for the estimation of the cost function because the number of branches was not 
available. However, they have been used to compute the Lerner index and the calculations of welfare loss using the parameters of the cost function for the rest of the sample. Consequently the 
sample size in the cost function is 29,694 observations.
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Table 2.  Interest rates and marginal costs 
a) Loans
1993 2002 1993 2002 1993 2002
AUSTRIA 0.092 0.066 0.011 0.013 0.013 0.020
BELGIUM 0.096 0.061 0.009 0.010 0.005 0.018
DENMARK 0.125 0.061 0.015 0.011 0.009 0.017
FINLAND 0.099 0.064 0.016 0.011 0.008 0.020
FRANCE 0.096 0.066 0.011 0.011 0.002 0.023
GERMANY 0.095 0.065 0.011 0.010 0.012 0.023
GREECE 0.147 0.077 0.013 0.014 -0.096 0.031
IRELAND 0.129 0.062 0.015 0.005 0.028 0.024
ITALY 0.131 0.078 0.018 0.019 0.012 0.026
LUXEMBOURG 0.096 0.081 0.006 0.006 0.009 0.041
NETHERLANDS 0.088 0.069 0.014 0.010 0.006 0.026
PORTUGAL 0.165 0.084 0.016 0.013 0.023 0.039
SPAIN 0.142 0.075 0.015 0.012 0.010 0.030
SWEDEN 0.132 0.069 0.017 0.013 0.030 0.015
UNITED KINGDOM 0.098 0.051 0.015 0.011 0.026 0.000
UE-15 0.105 0.067 0.013 0.012 0.007 0.021
b) Deposits
1993 2002 1993 2002 1993 2002
AUSTRIA 0.070 0.034 0.006 0.006 -0.008 -0.008
BELGIUM 0.074 0.036 0.007 0.008 0.001 -0.010
DENMARK 0.068 0.032 0.011 0.006 0.022 -0.005
FINLAND 0.071 0.026 0.009 0.006 -0.005 -0.001
FRANCE 0.072 0.054 0.008 0.007 0.003 -0.028
GERMANY 0.072 0.047 0.006 0.005 -0.007 -0.018
GREECE 0.122 0.029 0.010 0.011 0.096 -0.007
IRELAND 0.064 0.031 0.010 0.003 0.012 -0.001
ITALY 0.079 0.036 0.014 0.008 0.008 -0.011
LUXEMBOURG 0.084 0.084 0.003 0.003 -0.007 -0.053
NETHERLANDS 0.060 0.059 0.008 0.002 -0.001 -0.029
PORTUGAL 0.091 0.048 0.014 0.008 0.022 -0.023
SPAIN 0.080 0.029 0.013 0.009 0.024 -0.004
SWEDEN 0.084 0.035 0.008 0.006 -0.008 0.000
UNITED KINGDOM 0.057 0.026 0.012 0.006 -0.012 0.007
UE-15 0.073 0.043 0.009 0.006 0.001 -0.016
Source: BankScope and own elaboration
Interest rates (r L ) marginal costs (mc L ) Absolute margins (r L -r-mc L )
Interest rates (r D ) marginal costs (mc D ) Absolute margins (r-r D -mc D )
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Table 3. Lerner index of market power
a) Loans
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
AUSTRIA 0.140 0.271 0.334 0.416 0.383 0.327 0.351 0.182 0.230 0.307
BELGIUM 0.056 0.228 0.307 0.420 0.351 0.329 0.409 0.245 0.240 0.298
DENMARK 0.073 0.321 0.260 0.384 0.374 0.334 0.360 0.201 0.234 0.275
FINLAND 0.078 0.187 0.052 0.309 0.406 0.400 0.534 0.372 0.264 0.319
FRANCE 0.022 0.188 0.158 0.383 0.429 0.433 0.441 0.241 0.257 0.340
GERMANY 0.125 0.300 0.351 0.458 0.427 0.379 0.424 0.247 0.252 0.347
GREECE -0.654 -0.479 -0.282 -0.153 -0.076 -0.156 0.013 0.144 0.379 0.397
IRELAND 0.221 0.280 0.277 0.196 0.159 0.185 0.360 0.307 0.328 0.388
ITALY 0.092 0.121 0.048 0.104 0.145 0.259 0.373 0.267 0.349 0.335
LUXEMBOURG 0.095 0.228 0.347 0.505 0.493 0.501 0.550 0.436 0.406 0.513
NETHERLANDS 0.072 0.245 0.342 0.445 0.438 0.444 0.411 0.284 0.293 0.376
PORTUGAL 0.139 -0.060 0.053 0.135 0.233 0.355 0.429 0.339 0.408 0.461
SPAIN 0.071 0.245 0.121 0.241 0.317 0.363 0.432 0.279 0.374 0.398
SWEDEN 0.227 0.190 0.154 0.284 0.300 0.332 0.370 0.278 0.217 0.213
UNITED KINGDOM 0.266 0.270 0.094 0.047 -0.151 -0.048 0.046 -0.039 0.017 0.006
UE-15 0.091 0.221 0.203 0.315 0.325 0.327 0.382 0.233 0.270 0.326
b) Deposits
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
AUSTRIA -0.115 -0.296 -0.395 -0.510 -0.462 -0.392 -0.436 -0.189 -0.160 -0.226
BELGIUM 0.010 -0.188 -0.349 -0.483 -0.386 -0.376 -0.463 -0.273 -0.254 -0.291
DENMARK 0.322 0.010 0.026 -0.252 -0.305 -0.286 -0.378 -0.225 -0.146 -0.154
FINLAND -0.070 -0.125 0.015 -0.338 -0.366 -0.354 -0.625 -0.176 0.418 -0.019
FRANCE 0.040 -0.158 -0.149 -0.468 -0.554 -0.566 -0.601 -0.426 -0.415 -0.514
GERMANY -0.094 -0.289 -0.383 -0.538 -0.524 -0.436 -0.515 -0.308 -0.314 -0.395
GREECE 0.788 0.621 0.476 0.326 0.298 0.403 0.171 -0.003 -0.192 -0.241
IRELAND 0.187 0.209 0.079 0.054 0.121 0.187 0.055 0.042 -0.105 -0.029
ITALY 0.107 0.030 0.185 -0.010 -0.100 -0.262 -0.441 -0.210 -0.306 -0.296
LUXEMBOURG -0.078 -0.230 -0.400 -0.569 -0.586 -0.620 -0.667 -0.563 -0.521 -0.637
NETHERLANDS -0.009 -0.233 -0.377 -0.572 -0.522 -0.530 -0.531 -0.415 -0.428 -0.485
PORTUGAL 0.240 0.329 0.225 0.050 -0.101 -0.261 -0.403 -0.266 -0.365 -0.475
SPAIN 0.302 0.088 0.221 0.002 -0.091 -0.168 -0.337 -0.054 -0.123 -0.154
SWEDEN -0.091 -0.023 0.011 -0.217 -0.233 -0.336 -0.466 -0.352 -0.196 -0.006
UNITED KINGDOM -0.208 -0.222 0.073 0.221 0.456 0.288 0.199 0.250 0.139 0.281
UE-15 0.014 -0.155 -0.149 -0.327 -0.375 -0.365 -0.460 -0.287 -0.310 -0.369
Source: BankScope and own elaboration  
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Table 4. Welfare loss  associated to market power
Percentage of GDP
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
AUSTRIA 0.36 0.43 0.46 0.51 0.52 0.38 0.34 0.33 0.69 0.89
BELGIUM 0.27 0.31 0.06 0.13 0.15 0.07 0.18 0.09 0.11 0.28
DENMARK 2.12 2.04 1.54 1.41 1.11 0.92 0.68 0.82 1.13 1.14
FINLAND 0.12 0.27 0.12 0.18 0.35 0.44 0.44 0.57 0.72 0.61
FRANCE 0.18 0.36 0.25 0.35 0.27 0.19 0.20 -0.15 -0.05 0.03
GERMANY 0.41 0.78 0.73 0.80 0.54 0.67 0.60 0.29 0.29 0.57
GREECE 1.96 1.41 0.87 0.66 0.71 0.93 0.59 0.40 0.65 0.70
IRELAND 0.85 0.92 1.08 0.64 1.00 1.25 1.54 1.81 1.64 1.78
ITALY 1.05 0.79 0.88 0.48 0.34 0.47 0.66 0.66 0.92 0.79
LUXEMBOURG -1.73 -5.66 -12.85 -15.21 -19.02 -18.86 -12.59 -14.36 -9.96 -11.39
NETHERLANDS 0.34 0.50 0.64 0.63 0.73 0.88 0.79 0.15 0.08 0.31
PORTUGAL 1.47 0.88 0.92 0.59 0.54 0.74 0.88 1.12 1.52 1.58
SPAIN 1.24 1.26 1.13 1.06 1.10 1.12 1.03 1.00 1.47 1.39
SWEDEN 1.13 0.80 0.73 0.94 0.93 0.91 0.84 0.57 0.57 0.77
UNITED KINGDOM 0.73 0.66 0.57 0.68 0.30 0.50 0.62 0.41 0.36 0.42
UE-15 0.54 0.62 0.53 0.54 0.42 0.49 0.50 0.27 0.42 0.54
The table shows the welfare loss associated with market power calculated according to expression (4)
Source: BankScope, European Central Bank and own elaboration  
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Table 5. Mean efficiency scores
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
AUSTRIA 0.870 0.868 0.867 0.866 0.864 0.867 0.880 0.832 0.822 0.821
BELGIUM 0.894 0.903 0.896 0.875 0.848 0.798 0.824 0.800 0.784 0.776
DENMARK 0.897 0.905 0.883 0.853 0.833 0.836 0.831 0.802 0.886 0.885
FINLAND 0.724 0.780 0.849 0.870 0.795 0.818 0.827 0.888 0.872 0.932
FRANCE 0.844 0.841 0.851 0.857 0.872 0.857 0.850 0.840 0.842 0.848
GERMANY 0.871 0.865 0.866 0.864 0.854 0.853 0.835 0.834 0.829 0.833
GREECE 0.905 0.910 0.909 0.899 0.891 0.906 0.874 0.878 0.874 0.880
IRELAND - - 0.897 0.903 0.889 0.913 0.761 0.852 0.845 0.919
ITALY 0.893 0.889 0.895 0.894 0.893 0.894 0.876 0.874 0.862 0.861
LUXEMBOURG 0.833 0.822 0.825 0.818 0.784 0.769 0.806 0.791 0.772 0.805
NETHERLANDS 0.742 0.747 0.749 0.738 0.770 0.774 0.769 0.796 - -
PORTUGAL 0.828 0.836 0.881 0.854 0.852 0.848 0.838 0.825 0.766 0.740
SPAIN 0.864 0.872 0.881 0.884 0.886 0.884 0.877 0.873 0.872 0.881
SWEDEN 0.796 0.802 0.852 0.856 0.866 0.862 0.896 0.902 0.908 0.899
UNITED KINGDOM 0.838 0.835 0.843 0.853 0.854 0.838 0.875 0.887 0.907 0.899
UE-15 0.861 0.859 0.866 0.867 0.865 0.856 0.853 0.849 0.843 0.848
Source: BankScope and own elaboration
In Ireland (1993 and 1994) and the Netherlands (2002 and 2003) the efficiency scores have not been computed because the number of 
branches was not available
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Table 6. Welfare loss associated to banks' cost inefficiency
Percentage of GDP
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
AUSTRIA 0.292 0.334 0.332 0.370 0.361 0.457 0.304 0.311 0.288 0.312
BELGIUM 0.318 0.309 0.310 0.425 0.709 1.444 0.778 0.995 0.979 1.107
DENMARK 0.200 0.193 0.287 0.341 0.371 0.407 0.389 0.497 0.259 0.284
FINLAND 0.319 0.349 0.234 0.281 0.741 0.702 0.555 0.323 0.079 0.109
FRANCE 0.512 0.561 0.530 0.512 0.476 0.561 0.590 0.697 0.648 0.587
GERMANY 0.300 0.371 0.380 0.386 0.448 0.479 0.532 0.495 0.529 0.473
GREECE 0.157 0.166 0.174 0.214 0.245 0.213 0.253 0.284 0.283 0.288
IRELAND - - 0.035 0.040 0.037 0.024 0.041 0.013 0.014 0.007
ITALY 0.308 0.368 0.349 0.361 0.359 0.352 0.358 0.409 0.458 0.471
LUXEMBOURG 1.697 2.447 2.330 2.002 2.533 3.367 2.215 2.837 2.732 2.457
NETHERLANDS 0.049 0.057 0.073 0.103 0.065 0.074 0.069 0.060 - -
PORTUGAL 0.485 0.570 0.435 0.567 0.596 0.561 0.545 0.597 0.597 0.613
SPAIN 0.444 0.451 0.411 0.377 0.372 0.397 0.356 0.386 0.379 0.384
SWEDEN 0.265 0.290 0.271 0.271 0.255 0.276 0.186 0.187 0.184 0.160
UNITED KINGDOM 0.335 0.348 0.329 0.327 0.251 0.302 0.235 0.157 0.108 0.126
UE-15 0.345 0.388 0.372 0.378 0.388 0.444 0.417 0.423 0.422 0.402
Source: BankScope and own elaboration  
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Table 7. Determinants of cost efficiency
Lerner (loans) 0.0729 ***
(0.01)
Lerner (deposits) 0.0301 ***
(0.01)
HHIA (Total assets) -0.1108
(0.29)
HHIL (loans) 2.2586 ***
(0.35)
HHID (deposits) -1.8071 ***
(0.34)
Size (log of total assets) 0.0842 *** 0.0905 *** 0.0862 ***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
S1(commercial banks) 0.0699 0.0596 0.0657
(0.20) (0.20) (0.20)
S2(savings banks) 0.0734 0.0669 0.0681
(0.22) (0.22) (0.22)
S3 (cooperative banks) 0.1037 0.0939 0.0996
(0.21) (0.21) (0.21)
Adjusted R2 0.6669 0.6675 0.6674
Hausman Test (p-value) 52.6000 79.8000 88.7700
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Obervations 29,694 29,694 26,964
Lerner (loans) 0.2938
Lerner (deposits) 0.0461
HHIA -0.0489
HHIL (loans) 0.9925
HHID (deposits) -0.8611
Size (total assets) 1.8080 1.8589 1.8255
*** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5% and * significant at 10%.
 Source: BankScope (Bureau Van Dijk) and own elaboration.
All models were estimated using fixed effects and time effects (the Hausman test suggests 
that a fixed effects model is more appropriate). As efficiency is a variable bounded 
between 0 and 1, the log of a logistic transformation, ln [EF / (1-EF)], is used to estimate 
the determinant of cost efficiency. The excluded dummy specialization is S4 (Other type of 
banks). In brackets standard deviations
The elasticities with respect to total assets have been calculated taking into account that 
in the estimation the variable is in log. So, the elasticity values shown reflect the change 
in efficiency due to the change in total assets of the bank
Elasticities of efficiency to changes in the independent variables
Percentage change in the efficiency due to a 100% change in each independent variable
(3)(2)(1)
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Table 8. Social welfare gains associated to a reduction in market power
Percentage of GDP
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
AUSTRIA 0.25 0.23 0.61 0.42 0.25 0.00 0.05 0.21 0.32 0.24
BELGIUM 0.00 0.03 0.35 0.33 0.08 0.01 0.09 0.08 0.16 0.19
DENMARK 1.42 1.09 0.83 0.56 0.46 0.30 0.25 0.08 0.18 0.18
FINLAND 0.00 0.04 0.22 0.00 0.15 0.16 0.28 0.36 0.37 0.23
FRANCE 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.35 0.35 0.18 0.03 0.00 0.04
GERMANY 0.20 0.43 0.77 0.72 0.51 0.26 0.20 0.07 0.00 0.10
GREECE 2.95 2.85 1.76 1.91 1.96 2.54 2.04 0.90 0.54 0.36
IRELAND 0.57 0.49 0.60 0.56 1.12 1.21 0.75 1.14 0.86 0.88
ITALY 0.37 0.58 1.08 0.93 0.53 0.16 0.02 0.21 0.31 0.11
LUXEMBOURG 0.10 0.17 3.70 3.89 3.62 4.56 4.28 5.57 3.75 4.44
NETHERLANDS 0.00 0.10 0.62 0.57 0.57 0.66 0.16 0.30 0.14 0.28
PORTUGAL 1.03 1.57 1.24 1.15 0.77 0.36 0.31 0.64 0.87 0.81
SPAIN 0.86 0.68 1.01 0.87 0.59 0.47 0.35 0.62 0.87 0.63
SWEDEN 0.78 0.19 0.27 0.17 0.16 0.05 0.00 0.15 0.11 0.30
UNITED KINGDOM 0.83 0.21 0.51 1.17 1.75 1.62 1.37 1.23 0.94 0.92
UE-15 0.31 0.28 0.53 0.63 0.67 0.52 0.36 0.33 0.30 0.32
Source: BankScope, European Central Bank and own elaboration
Table 8 shows the social welfare gains associated with market power if countries with Lerner Indices in loans and 
deposits above the EU level were to converge to the average EU level, calculated according to expression (4)
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Table 9: Cost efficiency loss associated with a decrease in market power
Percentage of GDP
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
AUSTRIA 0.0009 0.0010 0.0026 0.0022 0.0012 0.0000 0.0002 0.0006 0.0008 0.0008
BELGIUM 0.0000 0.0002 0.0025 0.0028 0.0010 0.0001 0.0009 0.0007 0.0008 0.0013
DENMARK 0.0020 0.0027 0.0025 0.0018 0.0014 0.0008 0.0006 0.0005 0.0012 0.0017
FINLAND 0.0000 0.0002 0.0008 0.0000 0.0024 0.0024 0.0039 0.0042 0.0015 0.0018
FRANCE 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0019 0.0031 0.0033 0.0019 0.0003 0.0000 0.0004
GERMANY 0.0006 0.0017 0.0033 0.0032 0.0025 0.0013 0.0011 0.0003 0.0000 0.0005
GREECE 0.0042 0.0047 0.0039 0.0045 0.0049 0.0057 0.0041 0.0022 0.0028 0.0023
IRELAND - - 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
ITALY 0.0009 0.0020 0.0036 0.0035 0.0030 0.0011 0.0002 0.0017 0.0021 0.0011
LUXEMBOURG 0.0003 0.0008 0.0153 0.0165 0.0156 0.0201 0.0152 0.0218 0.0129 0.0187
NETHERLANDS 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001 - -
PORTUGAL 0.0032 0.0055 0.0045 0.0048 0.0036 0.0021 0.0019 0.0031 0.0028 0.0025
SPAIN 0.0031 0.0035 0.0042 0.0035 0.0030 0.0032 0.0023 0.0034 0.0042 0.0041
SWEDEN 0.0014 0.0006 0.0010 0.0007 0.0009 0.0003 0.0000 0.0007 0.0007 0.0019
UNITED KINGDOM 0.0029 0.0008 0.0015 0.0040 0.0046 0.0040 0.0041 0.0024 0.0017 0.0027
UE-15 0.0011 0.0013 0.0023 0.0029 0.0029 0.0022 0.0017 0.0013 0.0011 0.0014
Source: BankScope, European Central Bank, Eurostat  and own elaboration
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Figure 1. The Harberger´s triangle  
 
 
 
 
 
